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1Abstract
This paper develops an analytical model of a REDD+ mechanism with an international
payment tier and a national payment tier, and calibrate land users’ opportunity cost curves
based on data from Sumatra. We compare the avoided deforestation and cost-e￿ciency of
government purchases across the two types of contracts￿￿xed price and opportunity cost,
and across two government types￿ ￿benevolent￿ and ￿budget maximizing.￿ Our paper shows
that a ￿xed-price scheme is likely to be more e￿cient than an opportunity-cost compensation
scheme at low international carbon prices, when the government is ￿benevolent,￿ or when
variation in opportunity cost within land users is high relative to variation in opportunity
cost across land users. Thus, a PES program which pays local communities or land users
based on the value of the service provided by avoided deforestation may not only distribute
REDD revenue more equitably than an opportunity cost-based payment system, but may
be more cost-e￿cient as well
1.
Keywords: Payment for Environmental Services, avoided deforestation, agricultural expansion,
policy simulation.
1The authors thank Fabiano Godoy and Daniel Juhn from Conservation International for useful insights into
the Sumatra database as well as participants to the 12th annual Bioecon conference (september 2010), and
to the CERDI conference on "Environment and Natural Resources Management in Developing and Transition
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21 Introduction
Slowing down deforestation in developing countries is one of the main priorities for the future
of climate change mitigation. Indeed, tropical deforestation represents roughly 15 to 17% of
anthropogenic emissions of CO 2 (Van der Werf et al., 2009; IPCC, 2007). Moreover, mitigating
climate change by curbing deforestation in Southern countries has been estimated to be less
costly than abating industrial emissions in Northern countries (Murray et al., 2009; Naucler and
Enkvist, 2009). At the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which took place in Bali in 2007, a number of tropical
countries put a new mechanism on the negotiation table. This proposal is called Reduction of
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) 2. The main principle of REDD
is simple: Northern countries provide ￿nancial transfers to the Southern countries which reduce
their carbon emissions from deforestation below an agreed level, called the reference level. This
North-South transfer is proportional to the di￿erence between the reference level and the observed
level of emissions from deforestation. Such a mechanism is an indirect way to give a monetary
value to avoided carbon emissions by rewarding avoided deforestation, at a rate re￿ecting the
market value of CO2 emissions. Participation is voluntary, and in contrast to other North-South
￿nancial transfers such as development aid or structural adjustment programs, payments are
based on observed outcomes rather than commitments to policy changes. At the 15 th COP in
Copenhagen in 2009, REDD was formally included in the Copenhagen Accord.
Implementation of REDD at the national level requires that participating Southern countries
choose their own domestic policies to achieve their emission-reduction targets and to adequately
avoid domestic emission displacements from areas where emissions are reduced to other areas.
Amongst a wide array of deforestation-reduction policies, ranging from protected areas to control
of illegal logging (Peskett el al., 2008), payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly
cited as an appropriate tool to reduce deforestation caused by agricultural activities in forest fron-
tier area, which are estimated to be responsible for 75% of deforestation in developing countries
(Angelsen, 2009), and to help achieve national REDD goals (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounniko￿,
2The concept of REDD has since expanded to REDD+, which also includes conservation, sustainable man-
agement of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. This paper focuses on reduced deforestation rather
than other elements of REDD+.
32008; Ogonowski et al., 2009; Angelsen, 2009; Bond et al., 2009). The underlying principle of
PES is to ￿buy￿ from local land users a carbon sequestration and storage service provided by the
reduction of their deforestation and forest degradation activities. There is a large variety of PES
contracts, but the two main payment schemes include ￿xed-price contracts, in which a ￿xed pay-
ment is made to land users per hectare of avoided deforestation, and opportunity-cost contracts,
in which payments are made to compensate opportunity costs of avoided deforestation, based
on an evaluation of agricultural production losses incurred by land users when stopping defor-
estation. Southern countries wishing to participate to REDD will both have to decide on their
deforestation goals (which will in turn set the international ￿nancial transfer they can expect)
and the types of PES schemes they want to implement at the subnational level. These choices
will depend on their preference in terms of budget management and agricultural surplus. In this
paper, we will contrast the preferences of two types of governments: a benevolent government
that maximizes national social welfare, and a budget-maximizing government that maximizes
the net receipts from REDD (i.e. international REDD transfers minus internal payments to local
landusers).
The aim of this paper is to compare for these two types of governments the outcomes of
a ￿xed-price PES scheme and an opportunity cost PES scheme, for di￿erent prices of avoided
CO2 emissopns made by Northern countries. This analysis will provide insights on the strategic
choices made by Southern countries, both in terms of deforestation objectives and in terms
of domestic policies adopted to reduce deforestation. In section 2, we provide more insights
into the policy issues discussed at the international level for REDD implementation. We then
propose in section 3 a simple static optimization model capturing deforestation decisions by
heterogeneous land users within a country. This model is used to compare the outcomes of
two policy instruments to reduce domestic deforestation: an opportunity cost compensation
PES scheme and a ￿xed-price PES scheme. We then simulate the policy choices made by a
benevolent government and by a budget-maximizing government, as well as outcomes in terms
of public budget surplus, local income, and total avoided deforestation. Section 4 provides a
numerical simulation which helps to illustrate the sensitivity of these results to the characteristics
of agricultural production functions in the country and enables us to compare the two schemes
under di￿erent governmental preferences. In section 5, we use a GIS database on Sumatra’s
4opportunity costs of deforestation (Conservation International, unpublished), which enables us
to measure the respective performance of the two PES schemes,
2 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
and Payments for Environmental Services
Gibbs et al. (2010) estimate that 80% of recent tropical agricultural expansion is gained at the
expense of primary or secondary forest, mainly through the activities of subsistence farmers,
cash-crop small-holders and large companies, who clear forest to expand crops and cattle (Allen
et al., 1985; Barbier and Burgess, 1997; Morton et al, 2006; Rudel, 2007, Angelsen, 2009).
Prices, access to market, agricultural technologies, cost of conversion, land rights, and agro-
ecological conditions are key factors in the decisions to cut down forests to expand agricultural
land (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998).
So far, the main policies used by governments of tropical countries to limit deforestation
have been the setting-up of protected areas, with various consequences for land users who see
the acess to the area severly restricted, and the control of illegal logging and clearing activities,
which is costly and rarely e￿cient due to the poor de￿nition of land use rights and the large
area to be supervised (). The REDD scheme, by enabling developing countries to access new
￿nancial resources for avoiding deforestation, renders possible a new approach which is not
based on command-and-control approach, but on incentives targeted land users. It consists in
￿buying￿ from them a service in terms of avoided deforestation through contracts like payments
for environmental services (PES) (Wunder, 2009; Bond et al., 2009; Ogonowski et al., 2009).
Wunder et al. (2008) give some evidence that well-designed PES schemes can result in e￿cient,
cost-e￿ective and equitable conservation of environmental services (ES).
A payment for environmental services scheme is based around a contract signed between
providers and users of ecosystem services. The most widely-accepted de￿nition of a PES is pro-
vided by Wunder (2005): it is (i) a voluntary transaction where (ii) a well-de￿ned environmental
service (ES) or a land use likely to secure that service (iii) is being bought by a (minimum one)
service buyer and (iv) from a (minimum one) service provider (v) if and only if the provider
5continuously secures the provision of the service (conditionality). The underlying logic is simple:
the providers of ES forego alternatives uses of land, and are compensated by the bene￿ciaries of
the services (Bond et al., 2009). One of the key features of PES is the voluntary participation
of ES providers: ￿PES schemes incorporate direct checks and balances on welfare and equity:
if local people feel they will be disadvantaged by a conservation deal, they can simply decide
not participate￿ (Wunder, 2009). Indeed, the contract is supposed to be a win-win agreement,
where bene￿ciaries’ payments are conditional on conservation performance. In theoretical terms,
we expect that the payment must be at least equal to the minimum willingness-to-accept of ES
provider, measured by its opportunity cost of ES provision, and at most equal to the maximum
willingness-to-pay of the ES buyer, measured by its bene￿ts of ES use. Within this range, a large
spectrum of payment rules exists. In some schemes, ES buyers try to estimate the opportunity
costs of each ES provider and establish individual payments o￿setting these costs, as in Conser-
vation International’s Conservation Stewards Program (Niesten et al., 2010). Alternatively, ES
buyers can establish a ￿xed payment per unit of ES provided. This is the policy implemented
by the Government of Costa Rica to reward avoided deforestation, called Pago por Servicios
Ambiatales (Pagiola, 2008; Wunder, 2009; Ogonowski et al., 2009). Other schemes also try to
achieve equity or poverty alleviation objectives and establish other payments rules. For exam-
ple, Brazil’s Proambiente program involves paying a given share of minimum household income,
while the Amazonas State Government’s Bolsa Floresta program pays a ￿xed amount per family
(Ogonowski et al., 2009). In this article, we will restrain our analysis to the ￿rst two types of
payments: the opportunity cost compensation scheme and the ￿xed-price compensation scheme.
Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounniko￿ (2008) and Angelsen (2009) liken the overall REDD archi-
tecture to a multi-level PES scheme: the main idea of REDD is to create a multilevel (global-
national-local) system of payments for environmental services (PES) that will reduce emissions.
The international REDD mechanism is clearly designed as a PES scheme, because developed
countries (buyers) propose to pay governments in tropical forests countries (suppliers) for the
supply of a global public good (avoided emissions from deforestation and degradation). Then,
REDD income can be used by tropical country governments (buyers) to pay land users (sup-
pliers) for on-the-ground emissions reductions through reduced deforestation and degradation
activities.
6Of course, such a PES/REDD scheme requires monitoring of performance within forest coun-
tries. It necessitates access to reliable deforestation data, which can be provided by satellite
imagery, periodic on-site checks, and central database development (data on forest cover, forest
biomass, soil carbon, tree health, illegal activities, infrastructures development, etc.) (Angelsen,
2009). This type of information is rarely available in tropical countries but those who wish
to be eligible for REDD have joined a readiness phase for REDD, building their monitoring,
reporting and veri￿cation (MRV) capacities, and strengthening institutions (reduction of cor-
ruption, clari￿cation of land use rights and property rights, etc.) (Herold and Skutsch, 2009).
The implementation of the ￿rst phase will be ￿nanced by Northern voluntary funds. In the
Copenhagen accord established at the COP 15 in 2009, US, Australia, France, Japan, Norway
and the UK promised USD 3.5 billion for fast-start funds to empower REDD. In the months
following Copenhagen this ￿gure surpassed USD 4.5 billion. In this article, we make the assump-
tion that tropical countries have been able to pass the readiness phase successfully and have the
capacity to implement PES schemes to reduce their deforestation. This means that they are able
to estimate and report carbon emissions at national level, as set up in the IPCC Good Practice
and Guidance (IPCC, 2003, 2006) for reporting at the international level, and that the necessary
expenses for policy reform have been made to clarify land rights, improve the enforcement of law
and eradicate corruption, facilitating the implementation of an e￿ective, e￿cient and equitable
REDD-PES mechanism at a meaningful scale (Gregersen et al., 2010; Angeslen, 2009). We as-
sume therefore that they are in the implementation phase: a national reference level has been
negotiated and their governments are implementing domestic policies actions in order to achieve
deforestation reduction, ￿nanced by North-South transfer. We focus here on the PES policy
instrument. .
3 Agricultural expansion and policy options to reduce de-
forestation: a multi-level PES scheme
This section provides a static model of deforestation decisions by land users, which is then used to
identify optimal PES policy options by Southern governments. It is based on simple assumptions
7which help us to capture one of the important features of PES schemes: the structure of land
users’ opportunity costs.
Agricultural expansion in a business-as-usual deforestation
We consider a population of land users i, called ￿farmers￿ in the rest of the paper, practicing
agriculture in frontier forest land. Each farmer i may need to extend his farmed land, choosing
how much forest he will convert to agriculture. Under risk-neutrality, this choice takes the form





i f (L(i))   ! L(i) (1)
f is the agricultural revenue function of additional deforested land L(i). f(L;z) = P 
y(L;z)   C(z): where y is the agricultural production funtion de￿ning the output quantity as a
function of deforested land L and the vector of all other inputs z, P is the price of output and
C(z) is the cost of all other inputs. We assume f to be twice di￿erentiable and quasi concave
f0 > 0 and f00  0 . i is an e￿ciency factor characterizing each farmer i (i > 0). It encompasses
both the productivity of deforested land, which depends mainly on its slope, elevation, or quality
of soil(Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998); the farmer’s technical capacity (which depends on its
equipment and acces to technologies); and the di￿erence between the local price and the national
price of outputs and inputs (which may depend on the distance to main roads of farmer i and





. ! is the unit cost of land conversion. We assume, without loss of generality, that
this cost is constant across land at the forest frontier.
In the business-as-usual scenario (BAU), i.e. without any policy incentive to reduce defor-
estation, each farmer i chooses the level of deforestation LBAU








Since f0 is strictly monotonically increasing, LBAU






8We de￿ne 0 = !
f0(0), for which LBAU
i (0) = 0. In the rest of the analysis we will only
consider a population of farmers who deforest under the BAU scenario 3. We assume therefore
that  > 0 . Under this condition, LBAU
i (i) > 0 for all i. The deforestation behaviour is
illustrated in Figure 1. For i < j then LBAU
i (i) < LBAU
j (j). All farmers deforest and total






Figure 1: Marginal revenue as a function of deforested area
O
The REDD scheme: a North-South transfer to avoid deforestation
Each tropical country that reduces its deforestation receives a REDD transfer T from developed
countries, proportional to its avoided carbon emissions. For simplicity, we calculate the REDD
transfer on the basis of avoided deforestation A, multiplied by a single proxy value for the
quantity of carbon stored in one hectare of forest.A variety of methods have been proposed for
setting the national reference level (Busch et al, 2009). We make the assumption in this paper
3There is in reality three cases, developed in appendix 1
9that reductions are measured relative to a business-as-usual (BAU) deforestation level, i.e. the
deforestation level if REDD were not put in place. In our model, the national reference level is




i ()d. This reference level is compared to




i ()d, each farmer i deforesting
LP
i (i) under the PES contract. The North-South transfer is T, calculated as:
T = tA = t(LBAU
T   LP
T)
t is the international transfer rate for saved CO 2 emissions. It re￿ects the value of avoided
deforestation in terms of reduced emissions of carbon. t = P  EF where P is either the
international carbon price, ￿xed by the market if forest carbon is introduced in the international
carbon market, or an exogenous value chosen by Northern countries; and EF is the proxy carbon
emissions factor, which converts deforestation into carbon emissions. In this paper, we do not
consider di￿erences of carbon density within a country’s forest. Rather, we assume that EF is
the same for all types of forests. We also assume that a country’s level of aggregate deforestation
can be observed without uncertainty due to the monitoring, reporting and veri￿cation capacities
of the tropical countries, as described above.
National level: PES schemes
Southern government’s optimal decisions to curb deforestation
The Southern country sets up a PES scheme to reduce deforestation, in order to join the in-
ternational REDD scheme and obtain the transfer T described above from Northern countries.
Such a PES/REDD scheme requires monitoring of performance within forest countries. In this
article, we make the assumption that they have passed the readiness phase successfully. We
consider two types of Southern governments: a ￿benevolent￿ government that maximizes social
welfare, (measured here as total agricultural pro￿t plus income from the international REDD
transfer), and a ￿budget-maximizing￿ government that maximizes the di￿erence between income
from the international REDD transfer and payments made to farmers under PES schemes 4. This
4For simpli￿cation, we do not consider the potential positive feedback e￿ects on the budget of tax revenue from
agriculture.We also assume that governments do not take into account in their utility function the environmental
degradation associated with deforestation.
10￿budget-maximizing￿ type can capture the features of a corrupt government, wanting to divert
public money to the bene￿t of a political elite, but it can also describe a government wanting to
invest REDD income in other sectors (for education, health, infrastructure, or even agriculture).
All linear combinations of these two extreme types describe the range of governmental behaviors
that could be observed. The government maximizes its utility U, subject to budget constraint
that total PES payments cannot exceed REDD transfers:
max U = T + (BAU
T + P
T) + (1   )( E) (3)
s:t: T  E
where T is the REDD transfer from Northern countries to the Southern government described
above, P is the total agricultural pro￿t of all farmers participating in the national PES scheme,
and BAU is the total agricultural pro￿t of all farmers who do not participate in the PES scheme
and pursue their BAU agricultural activities. E is the total budgetary cost of the domestic PES
scheme, corresponding to the payment from the Southern government to farmers participating
to the PES.  describes the type of government: if  = 1, the government is benevolent and
maximises total welfare measured here as the sum of international transfers plus pro￿ts generated
by agricultural activities 5; and if  = 0, it is budget maximizing.
Two PES schemes are considered in the following section 6:
1) An ￿opportunity cost￿ compensation scheme in which each participating farmer is exactly
compensated for his opportunity cost of reducing deforestation. In this scheme, we assume that
participating farmers are required to abate deforestation to zero. The setting up of such scheme
requires that the scheme manager (thereafter the government) acquires a good knowledge of
individual farmer’s agricultural pro￿ts.
2) A ￿￿xed-price￿ scheme in which farmers are all o￿ered the same ￿xed payment per hectare of
avoided deforestation relative to their BAU deforestation. Under this scheme, farmers choose the
5PES payments to farmers are not included because they are considered domestic transfers: they are deducted
from the public budget and added to farmers surplus. If we assume that PES have no transaction costs, then
these payments are neutral in terms of total domestic welfare.
6These schemes align closely with the ￿quasi-auction scenario￿ and ￿per-ton carbon payment modality￿ de-
scribed in Borner et al (2010)
11level of avoided deforestation they want to achieve. This is based on the assumption that public
authorities can observe individual deforestation levels, both under BAU and under contract.
The opportunity cost compensation scheme
In the opportunity cost compensation scheme (OC) , we assume that the government can observe
farmers’ individual amounts of deforested areas under BAU, as well as farmers’ opportunity costs.
The government o￿ers a compensation payment to farmers equal to their foregone revenue, if
farmers agree to abate their level of deforestation to zero ( LP
i (i) = 0 if i joins the scheme). In
theory, farmers are indi￿erent between participating in the scheme in exchange for the foregone
revenue, or pursuing their agricultural activities. We assume here that, if given the choice,
farmers sign up and abate deorestation to zero. The government can thus select the farmers to
whom a PES contract is proposed, and will choose those with the lowest opportunity costs.
The scheme is illustrated in Figure 2: in the BAU scenario, farmers ,1 and   deforest OB,
OD and OE respectively. In the case where farmers  and 1 are selected to participate in the
OC scheme, farmer  reduces deforestation to zero and gets paid OAB, farmer 1 also stops
deforestation and gets a compensation OCD, and farmer   is not invited to join the scheme, but
deforests area OE.
Figure 2: Opportunity Cost Compensation Scheme







The government chooses the total level of deforestation which maximizes its utility, under
the budget constraint that total payments to farmers are not greater than REDD transfers.
12Farmers are invited to join the scheme, starting with the lowest opportunity cost farmer, up to
the ￿marginal farmer￿ ^ , whose contribution to the scheme enables the government to achieve its
chosen level of avoided deforestation. Farmer ^  is thus the last farmer joining the OC scheme.
He splits the group of farmers into two groups: those who are selected to participate,  2 [; ^ ],
and stop deforesting LP
i (i) = 0 in exchange for an exact compensation of their opportunity
costs, and those who do not participate,  2 [^ ;], and continue to deforest as usual LBAU
i (i).



















































We can see that the two maximization problems are equivalent. Indeed, increasing ^  has
exactly the opposite impact on
 
^  BAU
i (L())d and on
 ^ 
 BAU
i (L())d. This is due to the
uniform distribution assumption of the s7. Therefore, the marginal agent for the benevolent
case, identi￿ed by ^ B, is the same as for the budget maximizing case ^  = ^ B = ^ M: it is the




This result, which is only valid for the OC scheme, is easily understood: the interests of the
benevolent government (which maintains agricultural activity of high pro￿t farmers) converge
with the interests of the budget-maximizing government (which selects the lowest cost farmers
to limit PES expenditures). Moreover, the budgetary constraint imposes that the minimum
North-South transfer rate t be at least equal to the average opportunity cost of : in this case
 is the only farmer joining the scheme and tmin =
(L
BAU())
LBAU() . For more details about results,
see Appendix 3.
7under the assumption that the s are uniformly distributed
13The ￿xed-price scheme
In the ￿xed-price (FP) scheme, the government o￿ers a ￿xed-price K per unit of avoided defor-
estation. Each farmer i joining the scheme chooses the level of deforestation LP
i (i) he wants
to commit to, in order to maximize his income RP (i). The government chooses the total
deforestation level, which maximizes its utility: it sets the optimal K per hectare of avoided
deforestation corresponding to the desired total avoided deforestation.
Figure 3 illustrates the ￿xed-price scheme: farmers ;  ;  join the scheme. Farmers  and
  reduce deforestation to zero and get paid respectively OABC and OADE. Farmer  reduces
deforestation from OI to OH and gets paid FGHI.
The farmer’s maximization program is:
max
L
RP = i f (L(i))   ! LP
i (i) + K
 
LBAU





i (i) > LP
i (i) and RP (i) > BAU
i (Li)
The ￿rst-order condition is:
dR
dL






i and f0 is a decreasing function, LP
i (i) = f0 1(!+K
i )  LBAU (i) is always
veri￿ed.























s:t: t  KB

















s:t: t  KM
14We can see from equation 8 and 9 that the ￿xed price KB in￿uences positively the benevolent
government’s utility through higher payments to farmers, whereas the ￿xed-price KM reduces
the budget-maximizing government’s utility.
Figure 3: Fixed-Price Scheme
K3
K1








In order to calculate total avoided deforestation and total PES budget, we need to distinguish
between di￿erent levels of K:
￿ Case 1: if K;< f0 (0)   ! ) LP



































let’s call K = K2, all agents join the PES scheme. We de￿ne   = !+K2















￿ Case 3: if K  f0 (0)   !; then let’s call K = K3 ) LP





farmers sign the contract and abate deforestation to zero. We assume that the government
will give the lowest ￿xed-price K = f0 (0)   !, to avoid overpayments.
In all cases, the budget constraint imposes that t  K. For more details about the results see
Appendix 3.
15Comparison of the two schemes
We choose to contrast these two schemes because they both have advantages and drawbacks. It
is straightforward that the ￿xed-price scheme provides farmers with a positive net surplus since
farmers are always paid more than their true opportunity costs per hectare (see ￿gure 3). By
contrast, in the OC scheme, farmers get no extra surplus. From a poverty alleviation viewpoint,
the FP scheme is more desirable than the OC scheme. From a budgetary e￿cacy viewpoint, it
might seem natural to suppose that the OC scheme would always perform better. But this is
not always the case. Since farmers joining the scheme have to reduce deforestation to zero, the
last units of avoided deforestation are costly, especially if the marginal opportunity cost curve
of farmers is steep. Therefore there is a tradeo￿ between paying too much but targeting the
least costly units of avoided deforestation in the ￿xed-price scheme, and just compensating the
opportunity costs but also enrolling high cost units of avoided deforestation in the OC scheme.
Thus when considering an OC scheme versus a FP scheme, it is necessary to consider the trade
o￿ between including the most pro￿table units of deforestation of agents deforesting the least in
the OC scheme, and the least pro￿table units of deforestation by all agents in the FP scheme.
Which scheme is more e￿cient hinges upon a comparison of the overall opportunity cost of the
agents, and the steepness of their marginal pro￿t curve.
Of course, the ideal scheme from an e￿ciency and e￿cacy viewpoint would be an OC scheme
in which the regulator can also impose the individual deforestation abatement to each farmer.
Such OC scheme would surpass the ￿xed-price scheme in all settings and there would be no
interest in contrasting the two schemes. But such scheme would require perfect information both
on farmers’ types and behaviours.
To illustrate the trade-o￿, consider the extreme case of a society with only two famers j and
k (see ￿gure 4, case 1 and 2), who di￿er both in their total opportunity costs and marginal pro￿t
curves. In case 1, agents deforest about the same land area and the slope of their marginal pro￿t
curves are steep. In case 2, agents’marginal pro￿t curves are ￿atter than in case one, and j0 and
k0 do not deforest the same amount of land. In case 1, as the marginal pro￿t curves are steeper
than in case 2, so for an equivalent amount of total opportunity costs (ONH t O’N’H’and
ODMtO’D’N’), agent k and j deforest less than k0 and j0 (OH < O’H’ and OD < O’D’) so
16opportunity costs per hectare is higher for agent k than k0 and for agent j tan j0.
We assume that the government arbitrarly selects agent j in case 1 and j0 in case 2 for partic-
ipaton to the OC scheme. Under this hypothesis, in case 1 (case 2), avoided deforestation area
is OD (O’D’) and total budget expenses are OMD (O’M’D’). Now consider that the government
implements a ￿xed-price scheme with an arbitrary ￿xed-price of K in case 1, and K0 in case 2.
Under this scheme, in case 1 (case 2) avoided deforestation is AD+EH (A’D’+E’H’) and total
budget expenses are ABCD+EFGH (A’B’C’D’+E’F’G’H’). We see graphically that in case 1 the
￿xed-price scheme performs better in terms of avoided deforestation and it costs less than the OC
scheme, while we observe the contrary in case 2. The OC scheme has a more e￿cient outcome
than the ￿xed-price scheme in case 2, and vice-versa in case 1. Overall, this simple example
shows that we can expect the ￿xed-price scheme to be more e￿cient - i.e. performing better in
terms of avoided deforestation at lower cost - than the OC scheme, when the marginal bene￿t
curves are steeper. It is explained by the trade-o￿ described above between high payments for
the least costly units of avoided deforestation in the ￿xed-price scheme, or just compensating the
opportunity costs but also paying for high cost units of avoided deforestation in the OC scheme.
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Avoided deforestation: O’D’ > A’D’ + E’H’
PES budget expenses: O’M’D’ < A’B’C’D’ + F’G’E’H’      
Agent j’
Agent k’
Marginal Profit of 
deforestation
L
Case 1 : Steep marginal opportunity cost curves Case 2: Flat marginal opportunity cost curves
Indeed, the decision to compare these settings is also based in the structure of information and
control costs (table 1). An OC scheme imposing abatment to zero is easier to control than an OC
17Table 1: Needs of informations for each scheme
OC scheme Fixed-price scheme
Information on OC structure necessary not necessary
Information on BAU deforestation level necessary necessary
Information on individual deforestation level under PES not necessary necessary
sheme where each land user has a speci￿c deforestation level allowed (table 1). In contrast, under
the ￿xed-price scheme, the government does not need to know the opportunity costs structure
of land users, it just needs information on deforestation level (table 1).
Gregersen et al. (2010) emphasize the fact that an opportunity costs approach may be
inappropriate to implement equitable and e￿ective REDD program in case notably of unclear
property rights on land and carbon or other governance issues of corruption, enforcement of laws
or weak MRV system. As we suggest before, we consider here that these issues are resolved in
a readiness phase, previous the implementation phase. In case of the participants ￿have clear
title to their deforest lan, opportunity cost would be a relevant indicator as a strating point for
the negociations for REDD+ payments￿ (Gregersen et al., 2010). Of course, the implementation
of such PES contracts have signi￿cant transactions and implementation costs (Gregersen et al.,
2010) but the two schemes do not require the same information and monitoring costs (table 1).
Since such costs are very di￿cult to estimate, we make the simplifying assumption that these
costs are equivalent in average so in the following, we will not take them into account to compare
the two schemes. We further assume that there is no price feedback e￿ect and leakage. In other
words, the reduction of deforestation by agents joining a PES scheme does not provide additional
incentives to non contracting farmers to increase their deforestation levels. Moreover, we assume
that the payment is additional therefore payments do not go to someone who would have not
deforested in any case.
184 Comparison of PES schemes for the two di￿erent types of
governments: numerical simulations
Analytical results with a quadratic function
Without an analytical expression of f(Li), results in terms of total avoided deforestation, welfare,
and budgetary costs (available in Appendix 3), cannot be compared. In this section, we assume
that f(Li) is a quadratic function: f(Li) = a
2L2
i + bLi + c, with a < 0; and b;c > 0. Thus
f0 (Li) = aLi + b and the lower a is, the steeper the marginal curve is, which, as mentioned
above, is a crucial element determining the relative budgetary e￿ciency of the two schemes.
The BAU deforestation rate for farmer i is thus LBAU
i (i) = !
ai   b
a, and his pro￿t is
BAU









a . To be consistent with section 2, we restrict parameter
values in order to limit our analysis to a population of farmers having strict positive values of
BAU deforestation: LBAU
i > 0 ) !










￿ Under the OC scheme, the benevolent and the budget-maximizing governments adopt the
same target group of participating farmers. The marginal agent splitting the farmers’
population into two groups is ^  :
^  =
b(! + t) +
p
t2b2 + 2ac!2 + 4ac!t
b2   2ac
With values of a, b, c, t, and ! such that t2b2 + 2ac!2 + 4ac!t > 0.
￿ Under the ￿xed-price scheme, farmers maximize their income, choosing their level of defor-
estation LP










ai > 0 and his income under the scheme increases: RP
i   BAU
i =   K
2
2ai > 0. Avoided
deforestation increases as K increases and is greater for low productivity farmers (low i)






< 0 ; When K increases, the gains in terms of avoided deforestation are lower
for high productivity farmers with high i.
As noticed before, agents are better o￿ when the FP scheme is introduced. Moreover, note that
19the net gain in income is larger for farmers with low productivity and for farmers whose marginal













As stated above, we may face three di￿erent cases depending on the optimal value of K
chosen by each type of government. In case 1, where all farmers participate to the ￿xed-price
scheme but nobody stops deforestation altogether, the benevolent government redistributes the
total amount of North-South REDD transfer through the ￿xed-price scheme (K = t); while





. In case 2, where some farmers are encouraged to stop deforestation altogether and
others continue partially with agricultural activity, we observe that KB and KM are distinct
from each other, but without numerical analysis we cannot determine the value of the ￿xed-price
chosen by each government (see appendix 3 for more details). In case 3, where all farmers stop
deforestation altogether, we consider that the Southern government chooses the lowest ￿xed-
price scheme possible, i.e. the marginal opportunity cost of the last unit of deforested area of :
KB = KM = b   !.
Results of numerical simulations
In order to illustrate the di￿erent types of policy responses we can obtain, we choose two contrast
sets of parameters, presented in Table 1.








Simulation 1 -53 53 57 30 30 900 2 475 75 000 868 2 500 75 000
Simulation 2 -5 160 15 400 3 35 260 78 000 827 49 2 620
Table 2: Parameter values in the two simulations
The two sets of parameters (simulations 1 and 2) lead to equivalent total deforestation under
the BAU scenario (around 850). High pro￿t farmers are also quite similar in the two simulations
(the highest deforestation pro￿t is 75000 under simulation 1 and 78000 under simulation 2).
whereas the farming population in simulation 1 displays a much wider range of opportunity
costs per unit of deforestated area than the population of simulation 2 (the opportunity cost
per unit of deforested area is between 2500 and 75000 under simulation 1, and between 49
and 2620 under simulation 2). The agricultural productivity factor is multiplied by 30 between
20the least productive and the most productive farmer in simulation 1, it is only multiplied by
12 in simulation 2. In simulation 1, the marginal opportunity cost curve is steeper than in
simulation 2. Then two characteristics di￿er between both simulations: simulation 1 presents
more heterogenous average oppportunity costs and steeper marginal pro￿t curves, compared to
simulation 2.
We calculate total avoided deforestation and total utility of Southern governments, under
the two schemes, for the benevolent government and for the budget maximizing government 8.
Figure 5 to 8 present these results.
To analyze numerical results, we will focus on two policy issues:
1) What is the preferred PES scheme of the benevolent government and of the budget-
maximizing government, for a given level of international transfer t? To answer this question,
we assume that they choose PES scheme that provides the highest utility as de￿ne by equation
3 (￿gure 5 and 7).
2) If Northern countries had to select REDD countries, which ones would they choose? Since
in our model, international payments are strictly proportional to avoided deforestation, Northern
countries are supposed to be indi￿erent between targeting a single country or several countries
for an equivalent total avoided deforestation. But we assume that setting up a REDD scheme
and monitoring it is costly and that Northern countries prefer to limit the number of Southern
countries joining REDD. Moreover, it is very likely that the purchase of emission reductions
takes the form of bilateral agreement 9. Therefore, they will select countries o￿ering the highest
deforestation abatement (￿gure 6 and 8). Do the preferences of Northern countries coincide with
policy choices made by Southern countries?
We note that in simulation 2, the values of K are close to the t for the benevolent state
and to t
2 for the budget-maximizing state. In contrast, in simulation 1, the values of K move
away respectively from t and t
2. We note that for the highest values of t, the ￿xed-price of the
benevolent state is inferior to the ￿xed-price of the budget-maximizing state.
8Under the OC scheme, the results in terms of avoided deforestation and budget expenses per unit of avoided
deforestation are similar for the two types of governments, because they choose the same marginal farmer.
9Implementation phase could be based on bilateral agreement, between one Northern countries or an other
buyers of REDD credits and developing countries. For example, California’s private purchases are due to begin
in 2012. California will likely only choose to contract a REDD agreement with only one or two countries and
this choice will be partially guided by where they can reasonably expect that a su￿cient number of high-quality
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Figure 7: Simulation 2 Figure 8: Simulation 2
Utility evolution as a function of t Avoided deforestation as a function of t
22Simulations 1 and 2 provide contrasted responses to these questions, according to the structure
of the opportunity costs per hectare (see explanations in the previous analytical analysis).
￿ In simulation 1, the ￿xed-price scheme is clearly superior to the OC scheme for all levels
of carbon price: it provides the highest government utility, both for the benevolent govern-
ment and the budget maximizing government; it is also the scheme with the highest total
deforestation, for both types of governments. Figure 5 shows that donor countries would
select a benevolent-type government adopting a ￿xed-price scheme. In simulation 1, the
marginal opportunity cost curves are steep: since the last units of avoided deforestation
are costly, the ￿xed-price scheme is preferred to the OC scheme.
￿ Simulation 2 presents a more complex picture. For levels of t < t2, the benevolent gov-
ernment prefers the ￿xed-price scheme to the opportunity cost scheme, whereas for t > t2,
there is no clear advantage of one scheme over the other. The benevolent government faces
a trade-o￿ between o￿ering a high compensation to farmers (through a ￿xed-price sheme)
and getting a high international transfer (obtained through an OC scheme which garan-
tees larger area of avoided deforestation). Therefore, when the unit transfer t reaches the
threshold t2, the benevolent government becomes indi￿erent between the two schemes. The
budget-maximizing government, on the contrary, will increasingly prefer the OC scheme
when t increases. Does this coincide with Northern countries’ preferences? For t < t1,
they would select a benevolent government with a ￿xed-price scheme. For t > t1, they will
prefer any type of government adopting an OC scheme. This indicates that for values of
t between t1 and t2, Northern countries will select in priority budget-maximizing govern-
ments because for this range of t values, benevolent states prefer ￿xed-price schemes. In
simulation 2 the opportunity costs per hectare are lower than in simulation 1. It explains
why the budget-maximizing government prefers paying farmers their opportunity costs,
even for the last, more expensive units, rather than a ￿xed-price.
23Table 3: Outcome in simulation 2
Transfer rate t < t1 t1 < t < t2 t2
Choice of the benevolent FP scheme FP scheme indi￿erent
gouvernement
Choice of the BM OC scheme OC scheme OC scheme
gouvernement
Choice of donor Benevolent gouvernement BM gouvernement BM or benevolent
countries (North) under FP scheme under OC scheme gouvernement under OC scheme
5 Illustrative case study: Northern Sumatra
Description of the data
To go beyond numerical analysis, we test our model in an empirical context. The Indonesian case
is very interesting because this country has one of the highest deforestation rates in the world
and Indonesia’s government shows a willingness to get involved in REDD mechanism process.
Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions ranked at the fourth-highest in the world in 2005, following
China, the United States and Brazil (CAIT, 2010). Over 70% of these emissions are due to con-
version of natural forests and the associated burning and draining of peat lands (CAIT, 2010).
Conversion is driven largely by lucrative production of export crops such as palm oil and co￿ee,
with extractive logging often o￿ering a source of up-front ￿nance for agricultural conversion.
Sumatra lost about 30% of this forest cover between 1985 and 1997 (FWI/GFW, 2002) and this
trend has accelerated over the last ten years (FFI and Carbon Conservation, 2007). Progress to-
ward national REDD readiness in Indonesia is well advanced relative to other countries. In 2007,
Indonesia created the Indonesian Forest-Climate Alliance (IFCA), supported by several bilateral
donors (for example GTZ, DFID, AusAID) and the World Bank built a national framework
for long-term REDD implementation and identify the main methodological hurdles threaten the
REDD mechanism (Murdiyarso, 2009). Di￿erent pilot projects have been identi￿ed, led by local
governments, local NGO and private donors and companies. The main challenges for Indonesia
for the 2009-2012 period is to specify the rights and responsibilities of local communities, to ad-
dress issues of land insecurity of smallholders and the compensation of large landowners’ forest
rents, and to strengthen monitoring, reporting and veri￿cation capacities (Murdiyarso, 2009).
Di￿erent tools are currently tried in Indonesia to implement REDD mechanism: protected areas
24(FFI and Carbon Conservation, 2007), PES and concession purchases (Madeira, 2009). A num-
ber of studies have examined REDD+ scenarios in the Indonesian context (Gaveau et al., 2009;
Venter et al., 2009; Koh and Ghazoul, 2010) but to our knowledge ours is the ￿rst to examine
the implications of alternative payment distribution mechanisms.
To test the impact of di￿erent PES schemes on forest cover in Indonesia, we need to build
a model of deforestation driven by agricultural pro￿ts. We use a GIS data set follows Gaveau
et al. (2009) located in the Northern half of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This portion
corresponds to the forest cover of three provinces, which are divided into 37 districts. We study
the forest cover evolution between 1990 and 2000 in these three provinces. Our objective is to
estimate the BAU deforestation level and to compare this situation to a scenario where PES
schemes would be implemented.
Data on forest cover observed for the years 1990 and 2000 was obtained from 30 m resolution
change detection imagery (Conservation International, cit), aggregated to the 900 m level using a
50% forest cover threshold. Our database contains only land covered by old-growth forest in 1990,
representing 7 160 800 hectares of forest, each cell of the database in 1990 corresponds to 100
hectares of forest. Between 1990 and 2000, the studied forest cover decreased, and we observed a
loss of 867 900 hectares of forest (average annual deforestation rate of 1%). Oil palm production
is the main driver of deforestation in Sumatra and the more pro￿table activity responsible of
deforestation(FWI/GFW, 2002; Madeira, 2009), so we consider that deforestation between 1990
and 2000 are due to conversion for oil palm plantations, which allowed us to estimate opportunity
cost ceiling for forest cover. The in￿uence of driver variables on forest cover change between 1990
and 2000 was modelled using the logit regression. Explanatory variables are suitability for oil
palm production, forest biomass, slope, and elevation. This modeled regression estimates was
used to build an ￿e￿ective opportunity cost￿, representing the pro￿t from conversion to oil palm
for each cell. Details on the econometric model and the construction of the opportunity costs
are developed in appendix 5.
If the pro￿t of one cell is positive, we consider that the cell should have been deforested
between 1990 and 2000 under the BAU scenario. Thanks to this method, the total estimated
deforested area between 1990 and 2000 is equal to the observed deforested area between 1990
and 2000 (867 900 hectares), and the distribution of deforested areas through each district is
25equivalent (the di￿erence between deforested areas observed and estimated between 1990 and
2000, is inferior to 1% for each district). Data on above- and belowground forest biomass was
obtained from Tier I IPCC estimates (Ruesch and Gibbs, 2008), and we observe that on average
in the database, carbon density is 172 tC/ha, so we estimate that carbon emitted between 1990
and 2000 has reached 54.7 million tCO 2e/year on average. Deforestation for oil palm production
between 1990 and 2000 yielded an average pro￿t of 233USD/year. This total agricultural pro￿t
also corresponds to the amount of compensation that would have to be paid in order to conserve
a unit of forest that would otherwise be converted to oil palm plantation. To have an idea about
the budget needed to stop deforestation, if we made the simple assumption that we can pay
the carbon/hectare at the opportunity costs/hectare, to completely avoid deforestation in the
studied zone between 1990 and 2000, a average price of 4.25$/tCO 2is su￿cient ( 233
54:7).
Simulation
We assume that a PES/REDD payment is paid to each district according to the two types
of PES described before: OC scheme and ￿xed-price scheme. Whereas our analytical model
was developed at the farm level, reductions in deforestation achieved under alternative PES
policy scenarios in Sumatra were modeled at the district level (37 districts). We assumed that a
district represents the aggregated decisions of all farmers living in the district. This hypothesis
is closed to what happens in some REDD pilot projets in Sumatra, as those of the provincial
government of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, supported by the NGO Fauna and Flora International
and the Australian company Carbon Conservation Pty Ldt. This project was proposed in 2007 to
justify land reclassi￿cation from production areas to conservation areas and community-managed
low-impact areas, by using carbon ￿nance. It was approved under Climate Community and
Biodiversity Standards in 2008 by Rainforest Alliance 10. It would be implemented by district’s
government, and communities have indicated a strong willigness to participate. In our simulation,
the opportunity cost curve of a district is made of the ordered, from highest to lowest, estimated
opportunity costs of each cell located in the district. We ranked districts from the lowest average
opportunity cost district (equivalent to our  farmer in the section 3 model) to the highest
(equivalent to farmer ) (￿gure 5). Of course the distribution of district pro￿ts is not continuous
10http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/index.html











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
but it is closed to a uniform distribution.
The government will receive a transfer T from the North proportional to his avoided defor-
estation: T = t  A. t is the international rate for saved carbon emissions: t = P  CD  3:67
where P is the international carbon price, CD is the average carbon density in the country and
3.67 is the atomic ratio of carbon dioxide to carbon (ton CO2e/ton C). Here, we assume that the
North knows the average carbon density of the studied forest cover area (172 tC/100ha). Benev-
olent government utility is the sum of the North-South transfer and the agricultural pro￿ts from
conversion of forest cover of the districts, while the utility of the budget-maximizing state is the
di￿erence between the North-South transfer and the total budgetary cost of the domestic PES
scheme. We vary the carbon price to observe the evolution of governments’ utilities and the
avoided deforestation under the di￿erent schemes.
￿ Under the OC scheme, we assume that the government chooses the deforestation level
that maximizes its utility and then selects the districts (equivalent to our farmers in the
model) with the lowest average agricultural pro￿t when the scheme is proposed. In the







All districts with an average opportunity cost per hectare of deforested areas per year
lower than h, join the OC scheme. They are exactly compensated and stop deforestation
altogether. The other districts carry on with BAU deforestation.
27￿ Under the ￿xed-price scheme, the government o￿ers a price K by 100 hectares of avoided
deforestation. Each district can join the scheme and choose the cells in which to abate
deforestation. Cells of 100 hectares where the opportunity cost of avoided deforestation is
greater than K are deforested; cells where the opportunity cost of avoided deforestation is
lower than K remain forested and receive a compensation K. To facilitate the simulation,
we consider that K = t for the benevolent government, and that K = t
2 for the budget
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Figure 9: Governments’ utility as a function Figure 10: Avoided deforestation as a function
of carbon price of carbon price
If the government can be compared to our theoretical ￿budget-maximizing￿ government, then
we expect that for low carbon prices (below 4-5 USD/tonCO 2), it will choose the ￿xed-price
scheme and it reverts to an OC scheme for greater values of t (￿gure 9, table 3 and table 4).
If the government can be compared to our ￿benevolent￿ government, then it will be indi￿erent
the ￿xed-price scheme and the OC scheme for a carbon price above 6 USD/tonCO 2. For carbon
prices below 6 USD/tonCO2, it will prefer a ￿xed-price sheme (￿gure 9, table 3 and table 4).
We observe in ￿gure 10, table 3 and table 4, that all deforestation is abated under an OC
scheme for a carbon price of 6 USD/tonCO 2. The ￿xed-price scheme is more e￿cient in terms
of avoiding deforestation than the OC scheme, from carbon prices below 4-5 USD/tonCO 2 For
28Table 4: Results for a carbon price equal to 3 USD/tonCO 2
Type of government Benevolent BM Benevolent BM
Type of PES scheme OC Fixed-price
Deforestation without REDD (ha/10 years) 867 900
Deforestation with REDD/PES (ha/10 years) 777 600 558 700 703 700
Avoided deforestation (ha/10 years) 90 300 309 200 164 200
Budget expenses for PES scheme (million USD/10 years) 113 585 155
North-South REDD transfer (million USD/10 years) 171 585 310
Government’s surplus (million USD/10 years) 58 0 155
Government’s utility (million USD/10 years) 2 386 58 2 636 155
carbon price above 4-5 USD/tonCO 2, the OC scheme is more e￿cient.
Table 5: Results for a carbon price equal to 7 USD/tonCO 2
Type of government Benevolent BM Benevolent BM
Type of PES scheme OC Fixed-price
Deforestation without REDD (ha/10 years) 867 900
Deforestation with REDD/PES (ha/10 years) 0 180 000 485 500
Avoided deforestation (ha/10 years) 867 900 687 900 382 400
Budget expenses for PES scheme (million USD/10 years) 2 328 3 036.5 844
North-South REDD transfer (million USD/10 years) 3 831 3 036.5 1 688
Government’s surplus (million USD/10 years) 1 503 0 844
Government’s utility (million USD/10 years) 3 831 1 503 4 014 844
6 Conclusion
Designing an e￿cient international scheme to reduce deforestation is a key challenge in interna-
tional post-2012 climate change negotiations. As an international REDD+ mechanism emerges,
forest countries are readying policy frameworks to e￿ectively reduce deforestation. PES pro-
grams, in which national governments pay local actors for their forests’ climate services, and in
turn receive international payments through a REDD+ mechanism, are expected to be a main-
stay in these policy frameworks. Forest countries face a choice whether to structure payments
in national PES programs to be based on forest services provided by land users, or land users’
estimated opportunity costs.
Literature on payment designs for REDD have commented that ￿xed-price schemes retain a
greater share producer surplus within local communities, and avoid complicated mechanisms for
29eliciting supplier willingness-to-accept. Such studies have typically assumed that an opportunity-
cost compensation scheme is more cost-e￿cient for government purchasers than a ￿xed-price
scheme, since purchasers would pay suppliers for less consumer surplus. However, a ￿xed-price
scheme has a commonly overlooked advantage which is not possible under an all-or-nothing
opportunity cost contract: a ￿xed-price scheme allows suppliers to self-identify low-cost areas for
conservation, while maintaining productive land for agriculture.
In this paper we develope and calibrate an analytical model of a REDD+ mechanism with
an international payment tier and a national payment tier, to compare the avoided deforestation
and cost-e￿ciency of government purchases across the two types of contracts￿￿xed price and
opportunity cost. Our model is voluntarily simple and do not consider important issues of REDD
implementation, such as additionality issues, transaction and monitoring costs and property right
issues (see Borner, ). Nevertheless we give the interesting insight that a ￿xed-price scheme can be
more e￿cient than an opportunity-cost compensation scheme at low international carbon prices,
when variation in opportunity cost within land users is high relative to variation in opportunity
cost across land users. Thus, a PES program which pays land users based on the value of the
service provided by avoided deforestation may not only distribute REDD revenue more equitably
than an opportunity cost-based payment system, but may be more cost-e￿cient as well. A crucial
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34Appendix 1: The di￿erent options for BAU deforestation
If we consider a heterogeneous population living in the frontier area, we have to distinguish three
cases:
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35Appendix 3: Description of the two types of scheme for the two states
36Appendix 4: Optimal value of the ￿xed-price K
Benevolent State Budget Maximizing State
Case 1
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37Appendix 5: Construction of the opportunity costs in North-Sumatra
We construct an index of ￿e￿ective opportunity cost￿ based on observable variables, estimating
the in￿uence of driver variables on forest cover change between 1990 and 2000, using a logit
regression:
yi = logit(0 + 1Gi + 2Si + 3V i + 4Ci) (10)
With yi, a dichotomous variable capting observed forest cover change between 1990 to 2000.
All cells introduced in our database are covered by forest in 1990. If the forest cover is maintained
in 2000, yi = 0 in 2000, but if the cell is converted in arable land, yi = 1 in 2000. Gi is the
agricultural revenue per hectare (US$/ha), Si; is the the average slope per hectare (%), and Vi,
is the average elevation per hectare (m), are proxies for the cost of accessing forest. Ci, the
average above- and belowground forest biomass per hectare 11 (tC/ha), is a proxy for the cost
of converting natural forest. A single, monetized ￿e￿ective opportunity cost￿ for each cell was
constructed from the driver variables using the following formula:
Oi =
^ 0 + ^ 1Gi + ^ 2Si + ^ 3V i + 4 ^ Ci   ^ H
^ 1
(11)
Where ^  represents modeled regression estimates, Oi is the e￿ective opportunity cost for
celli, and H is a hurdle added to the modeled intercept such that total modeled deforestation is







where forest cover is maintained when the opportunity costs is negative (^ yi = 0 if Oi  0) , and
deforestation takes place if opportunity cost is positive (^ yi = 1 if Oi > 0) . Deforestation is more
likely to occur on land with higher estimated oil palm revenue potential, and is less likely to occur
on land with greater slope, higher elevation, or greater biomass.
11Data on belowground and aboveground forest biomass was obtained from Tier I IPCC estimates
38Table 6: Regression Results
Logistic regression Number of observations = 71609
LR2(4) = 17711;91
Prob> 2 = 0
Log likelihood=  17589;882 Pseudo-R2= 0;3349
Forest cover loss (%/10yrs) Coef. Std. Err z P > jzj [95% Conf. Interval]
Oil palm gross revenue ($/ha) 0,0005 0,000018 27,6 0 [0;00046;0;00053]
Slope (%) -0,027 0,0023 -11,73 0 [ 0;031; 0;022]
Elevation (m) -0,0007 0,000045 -15,79 0 [ 0;00079; 0;00062]
Biomass (tC/ha) -0,014 0,00021 -64,32 0 [ 0;014; 0;013]
Constant -2,032 0,15 -13,64 0 [ 2;32; 1;74]
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